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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article will discuss Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933
(―Securities Act‖).1
These statutes provide private rights of action for
misrepresentations or omissions in a registration statement and prospectus used to
register securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖). 2 The
article first focuses on the statute‘s legislative history and express and implied
defenses. The article next focuses on the heightened pleading requirements and the
defenses of due diligence, reliance, constructive knowledge, and loss causation.
Finally, the article discusses some additional factual scenarios from cases in which
the defenses of reliance, constructive knowledge, or loss causation could provide
grounds for early dismissal.
In general, the Securities Act requires that before securities can be offered or
sold to the public, the issuer must file a registration statement with the SEC,
including a prospectus.3 Sections 11 and 12 are the primary private liability
provisions of the Securities Act.4 As detailed below, Section 11 provides a right of
action for material misstatements or omissions in registration statements, 5 and
*

All three of the authors are attorneys in the securities litigation group at Alston & Bird, LLP.
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15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l (2009).
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Id.

There are various exceptions to the registration requirements found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d and 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508. This article concerns only those securities that are required to be registered.
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15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l.

5

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
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Section 12 provides a right of action for violations of the registration requirement
and for material misstatements or omissions in prospectuses and oral
communications in the offer or sale of securities. 6
There are several defenses to Securities Act claims that are either enumerated
expressly in Sections 11 or 12 or have been implied by the courts.7 Both Sections 11
and 12 contain an express ―due diligence‖ defense for defendants other than the
issuer who exercised due diligence in the relevant offering. 8 Section 11 also contains
an underutilized defense argument relating to the presumption of reliance discussed
below,9 and both Sections 11 and 12 provide a defense based on knowledge of the
plaintiff.10 As discussed herein, although actual knowledge of the plaintiff will clearly
suffice for this defense,11 where the factual circumstances suggest that the plaintiff
reasonably should have known of the alleged misrepresentation or omission because
the truth was publicly available or the plaintiff had access to such information,
liability should be limited based on the plaintiff‘s constructive knowledge.12
The loss causation defense provided expressly in Sections 11 and 12 13 should
be utilized to a greater degree at earlier procedural postures in the litigation. Loss
causation is a defense, and thus it is the defendant‘s burden to demonstrate that loss
causation is lacking; nonetheless, this argument can and should be used at the
motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment stages where the undisputed
facts show that the defendant‘s statements did not cause the plaintiff‘s loss as a
matter of law. Numerous courts, including recently the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have discussed these defenses and applied them to
pre-trial motions. 14

6

15 U.S.C. § 771.

7

15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l.

8

See infra notes 69-73, 83-84 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 64, 80 and accompanying text.

11

Id.

12

See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 65, 81 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text, discussing APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc.,
476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter APA IV]. The following earlier opinions from the case
14
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Finally, it is well-established that a Section 11 claim that ―sounds in fraud‖
must be pled with particularity, and thus may be subject to dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) if the requisite details are lacking. 15 As discussed below,
a recent case out of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia demonstrates proper application of this principle to dismiss a Section 11
claim based on the same allegations used to support a fraud claim under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (―Exchange Act‖). 16

II.

SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
A.

Statute and Legislative History

Section 11 of the Securities Act provides for liability for false or misleading
statements contained within a registration statement. 17 To be actionable, the
are also relevant to this article: APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., No. 1:99-cv-1377-JOF
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2003) [hereinafter APA I]; APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., No. 0315552 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter APA II]; and APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc.,
No. 1:99-CV-1377-JOF (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter APA III].
15

See, e.g., Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2006).

See infra notes 36-44, 58-61 and accompanying text, discussing In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., Civil
Action No. 1:02-CV-1467-RWS, 2009 WL 48188 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2009).
16

17

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). The statute states the following:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue–
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar
functions) or partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the
registration statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions,
or partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
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―‗misrepresentation or omission must pertain to material information that the
defendant had a duty to disclose.‘‖18 ―‗[T]here must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the ―total mix‖ of information made available.‘‖19
If the investor made a purchase pursuant to the registration statement, ―he
need only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his prima facie
case.‖ 20 He may then bring a claim under Section 11 against the issuer, its officers,
directors, and underwriters, any signatory to the registration statement, and any
expert who has consented to being named as having prepared or certified any part of
the statement or any report or valuation that is used in connection with the
statement. 21 As discussed below, however, the plaintiff does not need to
demonstrate that he relied on the registration statement in order to recover under
Section 11 if he bought the security within the presumptive period of reliance in the
statute.22 Rather, reliance is presumed as a matter of law during that time period,
although there are certain fact patterns described below that can rebut that
presumption. 23

named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement, in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting City of
Monroe v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 238 (1988).
18

19

Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).

20

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).

21

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).

22

See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.

Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that there is a ―conclusive
presumption of reliance upon the registration statement by ‗every person acquiring any securities
specified in such statements and offered to the public.‘‖) (quoting S. 875, 73d Cong. § 9 (1933); H.R.
4314, 73d Cong. § 9 (1933)). For a more detailed description of the manner in which the presumption
of reliance operates, see infra Section IV.
23
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Section 11 was implemented primarily to ―assure compliance with the
disclosure provisions of the [1933] Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability
on the parties who play a direct role in a registered offering.‖ 24 The two primary
objectives of the Securities Act were (i) investor protection through adequate and
accurate disclosure and (ii) fraud prevention.
Section 11, along with Sections 12 and 14, implements the second objective
by permitting an aggrieved investor to maintain a private right of action against the
person or persons who engaged in the fraud. 25 As the House of Representatives
Report noted with respect to the creation of Section 11, ―‗the connection between
the statements made and the purchase of a security is clear, and, for this reason, it is
the essence of fairness to insist upon the assumption of responsibility for the making
of these statements.‘‖ 26
The legislative history of the Securities Act is also important to consider
when assessing the intended parameters of the liability provisions. As Professor
Seligman has noted, ―[t]he announced aim of Congress in passing the Securities Act
was to inform investors of the facts concerning securities offered for sale and to
protect them against fraud and misrepresentation.‖ 27 Representative Greenwood
observed of the Securities Act that:
The necessity for this legislation to help restore confidence in our
local banking institutions is great . . . . There is a peculiar fact with
respect to such investments in that the corporation that issues the
securities knows more about them than anyone else, and the old rule
of caveat emptor, or the buyer beware, certainly should not apply to this
character of investments. The man who sells them ought to give the

24

Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381-82.

25

Id.

Krista L. Turnquist, Note, Pleading Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2395, 2405 n.63 (2000) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 10 (1933)).
26

Joel Seligman, Gotterdammerung for the Securities Act?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 887, 888 (1997). See also H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (―The overriding
purpose of our [n]ation‘s securities laws is to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the
securities markets . . . .‖).
27
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facts, and the Government ought to require the issuer of securities to
give all the facts, and be honest with the public. 28
The focus of the Securities Act, however, is protecting the open market
investor, not sophisticated investors with inside information, due diligence rights, or
other knowledge not shared by the public. 29 As noted by one scholar, ―[t]he sale of
an issue of securities to . . . a limited group of experienced investors[ ] was certainly
not a matter of concern to the federal government.‖ 30 As discussed below,
precluding Section 11 liability when reliance and loss causation are impossible
enhances these goals. 31
In reviewing the need for a proper channel to purchase and sell securities
with the attendant comfort that full disclosure was designed to protect, the Senate
further noted that the Securities Act was created in order to:
protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation,
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to
the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of
the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to
bring into productive channels of industry and development capital
which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in
providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power. 32
The Securities Act, however, was not intended to be an insurance against
losses not caused by wrongdoing.33 In commenting on the Securities Act, President
Turnquist, supra note 26, at 2404 n.50 (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 2914 (1933) (statement of Rep.
Greenwood)).
28

James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 37
(1959-60).
29

30

Id.

31

See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.

Seligman, supra note 27, at 888 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-47 (1933)); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995) (noting that the meaningful change effected by the Securities Act was ―the
creation of federal duties—for the most part, registration and disclosure obligations—in connection
with public offerings‖).
32

Henry Klehm III, Contractual Shifting of Defense Costs in Private Offering Securities Litigation, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 971, 974 (1988) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s Message to the Senate Concerning
Regulation of Securities Issues, 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
33
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Roosevelt underscored its twin objectives – investor protection and fraud
prevention.34 In his report to Congress, he made it apparent that the Securities Act
was necessary in order to foster and promote a degree of openness and honesty in
the securities market that had theretofore been absent. 35
[T]he Federal Government cannot and should not take any action
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly
issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be
maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn
profit. There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the
buying public. This proposal . . . puts the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller . . . . The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to
protect the public with the least possible interference to honest
business.36
Under the Section 11 liability construct, the registration statement is intended
to provide open market investors with a reserve of reliable information upon which
to make investment decisions.37 But it is the authors‘ view – buttressed by case law
and legislative history – that investors who did not rely on the market and instead
evaluated investment decisions based on inside information were not intended to fall
under the protective umbrella of Section 11 of the Securities Act.38 It was believed
by the authors of the legislation that ―bureaucracy, untrained in these matters as it
was, could hardly equal these investors for sophistication, provided only it was their
own money that they were spending.‖39
34

Id. at 974-75.

35

Id. at 974.

36

Id. at 974.

Elizabeth T. Tsai, Annotation, What Constitutes a “Public Offering” Within Meaning of § 4(2) of Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2)), Exempting From Its Registration and Prospectus Requirements Transactions
by an Issuer Not Involving “Any Public Offering,” 6 A.L.R. FED. 536, *2a (1971).
37

See United States Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities
Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml.
38

39

Landis, supra note 29, at 37.
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In as much as the Securities Act does not provide a cause of action for fraud,
it does create a lower standard for establishing liability than the Exchange Act. 40 A
Section 11 claim, for example, does not require proof of scienter. 41
In light of the comparatively low burden under Section 11 and the intent of
the statute, the pool of potential purchasers who would qualify to bring a claim
under Section 11 has been defined narrowly. 42 Because the registration statement
and prospectus are ―snapshots‖ of the financial picture of the company at the time
of the offering, the Securities Act protects investors who purchase directly in the
offering or, as discussed below, ―traceable‖ to the offering.43 Thus, unlike a claim
brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, only certain after-market
purchasers have standing. 44 Artificially expanding the pool of potential plaintiffs
chills issuers in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the Securities Act. 45
Federal case law has routinely recognized the narrow scope of liability under
the Securities Act.46 Indeed, where fraud has really been committed and where a
shareholder plaintiff really has been injured as a direct result of the fraud, Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act would be the typical remedy. 47
Accordingly, as discussed fully below, the authors believe precedent and
legislative history teach that there should be no liability under Section 11 where a
plaintiff is a sophisticated investor, has access to insider information, benefits from
due diligence rights and obligations, or otherwise should have known of the allegedly
See, e.g., In re Unicapital Corp. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2001). The
Exchange Act imposes a greater burden of proof on plaintiffs and, as a result, does not demand that
the potential class of plaintiffs who may bring claims thereunder be restricted. In particular, claims
under the Exchange Act place on plaintiffs the significant onus to prove that a defendant acted with
scienter. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
40

41

See, e.g., In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 274 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004).

42

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2009).

43

See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.

44

Id.

45

Id.

See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d
893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977); Guenther v. Cooper Life Scis. Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437, 1439 (N.D. Cal.
1990); APA II, supra note 14, at 16.
46

47

See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2009).
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misleading information. Congress said as much in enacting the statute when it stated
that ―he should suffer the loss who occupies a position of trust in the issuing
corporation toward the stockholders, rather than the buyer of a stock who must rely
upon what he is told.‖48 Furthermore, courts have recognized the sensibility of the
premise by holding that ―Section 11 [liability] is imposed and justified because
members of the public are presumed to be ‗innocent‘ and, as compared with the
issuers of stock, do not have the ‗opportunity to learn the truth;‘ instead, they are
merely reliant upon what they are told.‖ 49
B.

Heightened Pleading Requirements for Section 11 Claims that “Sound in Fraud”

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with
particularity facts satisfying each element of claims falling within the purview of the
rule.50 Even before Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 51 in
1995 to heighten the pleading requirements of securities fraud claims, courts held
that Rule 9(b) applied to claims where reputational concerns were implicated,
including Securities Act claims. 52
It is now well established in many federal circuits that Section 11 claims that
―sound in fraud‖ must be pled with particularity in conformance with Rule 9(b). 53 A
claim ―sounds in fraud‖ where ―the facts underlying the misrepresentation at stake in

48

S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 5 (1933).

49

APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 5 (1933)).

50

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

51

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2009).

See Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990); DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus.,
Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Elscint,
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 384 (D. Mass. 1987); Fine v. Rubin, 623 F. Supp. 171, 172 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Fire Fly Enter., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 336, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
52

See Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006); Cal. Pub.
Employees‘ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 161 (3d Cir. 2004); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d
164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky‘s, Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir.
2001); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996); Sears, 912 F.2d at 892-93. Cf.
In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 314-15 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing the applicability
of Rule 9(b) to Section 11 claims ―grounded in fraud,‖ while holding that Rule 9(b) did not apply in
the instant case).
53
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the claim are said to be part of a fraud claim, as alleged elsewhere in the complaint.‖ 54
The Eleventh Circuit held as follows:
It is not enough to claim that alternative pleading saves the non-fraud
claims from making an allegation of fraud because the risk to a
defendant‘s reputation is not protected. It would strain credulity to
claim that Rule 9(b) should not apply in this allegation: [t]he
defendant is a no good defrauder, but, even if he is not, the plaintiff
can still recover based on the simple untruth of the otherwise
fraudulent statement. Nor is it enough to present a general
disclaimer in an attempt to immunize the non-fraud claims from the
Rule 9 requirements, for the same common sense reasons. The
purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant‘s good will and
reputation when that defendant‘s conduct is alleged to have been
fraudulent.55
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
recently applied this principle to dismiss a Section 11 claim based on the same facts,
which the court held failed to state a Section 10(b) claim. 56 In In re Mirant Corporation
Securities Litigation, the plaintiffs‘ Section 11 and Section 10(b) claims were based on
the allegation that defendants violated the federal securities laws by failing to disclose
that Mirant engaged in purported illegal Enron-type energy trading and some
accounting errors. 57
The court held that the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) applied
because the Section 11 claims sounded in fraud; for example, the allegations against
the Section 11 defendants were ―inextricably intertwined with their allegations
against the [Section 10(b) defendants].‖ 58 Specifically, plaintiffs had incorporated in
the Securities Act count ―hundreds of pages of mostly fraud allegations before
employing the disfavored‖ general disclaimer of fraud. 59 Moreover, every single
54

Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1278.

55

Id.

In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 1:02-CV-1467-RWS, 2009 WL 48188, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7,
2009). Authors Todd R. David and Jessica P. Corley were defense counsel in the Mirant case.
56

57

Id.

58

Id. at *15.

59

Id.
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alleged misstatement or omission on which plaintiffs based their Section 11 claim
was also alleged as a fraudulent misstatement or omission against the former
officers.60 Based in part on this holding, the court dismissed the Section 11 and
Section 10(b) claims.61
Thus, the heightened pleading standards should apply to a Section 11 claim
with fraud at its core. As demonstrated by the Mirant case, courts continue to take a
hard look at the underlying allegations to determine if plaintiffs have met their
burden of pleading a misrepresentation or omission of material fact in the relevant
offering document.
C.

Express Defenses under Section 11

Section 11 contains several express defenses. First, the defendant can show
that there simply was no materially false or misleading statement or omission
contained within the registration statement at issue.62 Section 11 is not designed to
punish something that is not misleading or was disclosed. Second, if the plaintiff
knew of the misstatement or omission and made his purchase notwithstanding, no
liability can be imposed.63 Another defense to a Section 11 claim is lack of loss
causation, which exists when the defendant is able to demonstrate that any damages
the plaintiff claims to have sustained were the result of something other than the
alleged misstatement or omission in the registration statement. 64 In addition, the
60

Id.

61

Id. at *16.

62

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2009).

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)id. (―unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition [the investor] knew
of such untruth or omission.‖); see also Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 483 F.3d 70, 73 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging the defense that ―the plaintiff knew of the untruth or omission at the time of his or
her acquisition of the security.‖) (quoting IX LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 4528 (3d ed. 2004)). For more discussion on the constructive knowledge aspect of this
defense, see discussion infra at Section III(C).
63

See Miles, 483 F.3d at 73 n.1; In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005)
(―[D]efendants can limit damages by showing that the plaintiffs‘ losses were caused by something
other than their misrepresentations.‖); Miles, 483 F.3d at 73 n.1; Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express
Inc., No. 85-1703, 1987 WL 44742, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc.,
No. 02-168 (WHW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30001, at *24WL 1217980, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Apr. 23,
2007); Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., No. 85-1703, 1987 WL 44742 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1987); see
also discussion infra at Section V.
64

64

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

plaintiff must be able to ―trace‖ his purchase of the stock to the defective
registration statement.65 To trace, the plaintiff must be able to prove that the only
shares in the market at the time he purchased his shares were those issued pursuant
to the allegedly false registration statement.66 If, for example, the defendant can
show that the investor purchased the stock in a prior offering, and thus before the
defective registration statement was issued, the plaintiff‘s claim under Section 11 will
fail.67
Section 11 also provides a defense for all defendants (other than the issuer)
that acted reasonably and in good faith (the ―due diligence‖ defense). 68 Specifically, a
non-issuer defendant avoids liability under Section 11 if he can prove as to non―expertized‖ portions of the registration statement that ―he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe‖ there were no
misstatements or omissions of material facts in such portions of the registration
statement. 69
Section 11 also shields defendants from liability for material misstatements or
omissions in information provided by experts. 70 It is well established that an
accountant qualifies as an expert, and audited financial statements are considered
―expertized‖ portions of a registration statement. 71 As to ―expertized‖ portions of
the registration statement (such as audited financial statements), a non-issuer
defendant avoids liability if he can prove that he ―‗had no reasonable ground to
believe and did not believe‘‖ that such portions of the registration statement
contained misstatements or omissions of material facts. 72 Thus, a reasonable

See APA IV, 476 F.3d, supra note 14, at 1276; Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 294 F.3d 969, 977-78
(8th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. NYFIX, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 105, 118 (D. Conn. 2005). Sections 11 and
12 include additional defenses, such as the due diligence defense, that are beyond the scope of this
article, and thus not discussed herein.
65

66

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1276; Lee, 294 F.3d at 978; Johnson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 118.

67

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1276; Johnson, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 118.

68

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2009); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 (1976).

69

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B).

70

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C).

71

See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 623 (9th Cir. 1994).

72

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C)).
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investigation standard applies to non-―expertized‖ portions, while a reasonable
reliance standard applies to ―expertized‖ portions.

III.

SECTION 12 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
A.

Statute and Legislative History

Section 12 of the Securities Act provides for liability for false or misleading
statements contained within prospectuses or as part of oral communications. 73
Although the legislative history behind Section 12 is ―sparse,‖ 74 the statute was
enacted primarily for the same reason as Section 11 – i.e., investor protection and
fraud prevention. As explained by Senator Duncan Fletcher, the Securities Act was
designed to protect:
[p]eople [who] have been persuaded to invest their money in
securities without any information respecting them, except the
advertisements put forth by the agents or representatives of those
73

See 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2009). The statute provides as follows:
Any person who –
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section
77c of this title, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this
section, to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
security.

15 U.S.C. § 77l(a).
See, e.g., Therese Maynard, The Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. REV. 817, 842-43
(1994).
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issuing the securities, and such advertisements have not given full
information to the public.75
Indeed, the House Report observed as follows:
The character of civil liabilities imposed by this bill [is] described in
detail elsewhere.
Their essential characteristic consists of a
requirement that all those responsible for statements upon the face of
which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held to
standards like those imposed by law upon a fiduciary. . . . The bill
affects only new offerings of securities . . . . It does not affect the
ordinary redistribution of securities unless such redistribution takes
on the characteristics of a new offering by reason of the control of
the issuer possessed by those responsible for the offering.76
It is clear that Congress was concerned about the negative effects of false or
misleading information, particularly given the complexity most often associated with
the financial transactions and background surrounding securities offerings in general.
The purpose of these sections is to secure for potential buyers the
means of understanding the intricacies of the transaction into which
they are invited.
The full revelations required in the filed
―registration statement‖ should not be lost in the actual selling
process. This requirement will undoubtedly limit the selling
arguments hitherto employed. That is its purpose. . . . Any objection
that the compulsory incorporation in selling literature and sales
argument of substantially all information concerning the issue, will
frighten the buyer with the intricacy of the transaction, states one of
the best arguments for the provision.77
B.

Express Defenses Under Section 12

Section 12 defenses are similar to the defenses available under Section 11.
For example, the defendant may show that the prospectus or oral communication at

75

77 CONG. REC. 2961, 2982 (1933).

76

H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933) (to accompany H.R. 5480, 73d Congress (1933)).

77

Id. at *8.
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issue did not contain a materially false or misleading statement or omission. 78 In
addition, there is a knowledge defense, i.e., the defendant may demonstrate that the
plaintiff was aware of the misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase
of the security.79 There is also a loss causation defense if the defendant can prove
that the damages the plaintiff claims to have sustained were the result of something
other than the supposed misstatement or omission in the prospectus or oral
communication.80
The standing requirement is stricter under Section 12 than under Section 11.
Under Section 12, the plaintiff must also show that he purchased the securities
directly in the offering and not in the aftermarket.81
Similar to the due diligence defense of Section 11, Section 12(a)(2) provides a
defense of reasonable care for all defendants ―that is less demanding than the duty of
due diligence.‖82 This ―lack of negligence‖ defense provides that a defendant shall
not be liable if he ―sustain[s] the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission‖
which is ―necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading.‖ 83
As noted above, the defenses in Sections 11 and 12 are rarely used in
dispositive motion practice. The next section of the article discusses the application
of four specific defenses – reliance, constructive knowledge, loss causation, and
truth-on-the-market – that provide useful tools for early dismissal.

78

See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a); see also Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 1996).

79

15 U.S.C. § 771(a).

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l(a), (b). Although the plaintiff need not prove loss causation, transaction
causation is required. The plaintiff must prove that the misrepresentation caused him to enter into
the transaction, even if such causation does not rise to the level of reliance. See Beloit Corp. v. Emett
& Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154, 1991 WL 153459, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991); Smolen v. Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells, 921 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1990); Barnes v. Res. Royalties, Inc., 795 F.2d 1359, 1366
n.9 (8th Cir. 1986).
80

See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995); see also Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d
272, 287 n.16 (3d Cir. 1992).
81

In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also 15 U.S.C. §
77l(a)(2); Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1019 (2d Cir. 1989).
82

83

15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).
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THE PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE UNDER SECTION 11

As noted above, there is a presumption under Section 11 that the investor
relied on the false or misleading statement at issue, and therefore he does not need to
show independently that he relied on the alleged misstatement in purchasing or
selling the securities.84 In that regard, a Section 11 claim imposes strict liability on
the person or persons responsible for the misstatement. The presumption of
reliance operates, however, under a 12-month prescriptive period.
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made
generally available to its security holders an earning statement
covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the
effective date of the registration statement, then the right of recovery
under this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person
acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the
registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and
not knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such
person.85
Professor O‘Hare has noted that this provision ―has been interpreted to
mean that reliance upon the false or misleading statement appearing in the
registration statement is presumed during the initial 12 month period following the
effective date of the registration statement.‖ 86 In other words, ―there is a conclusive
presumption of reliance for any person purchasing the security prior to the
expiration of twelve months.‖ 87 After that period has concluded, the plaintiff must
be able to show reliance in order to prevail on his claims under Section 11. 88
Thus, Section 11, by its explicit language, contemplates three distinct time
periods. First, it implies the pre-presumptive period, i.e., before a registration
84

See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.

85

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2009).

Jennifer O‘Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217, 226 n.36 (1996).
86

87

2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.3[4] (6th ed. 2008).

Reliance may be established without proof of the reading of the registration statement by the
investor. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
88
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statement is issued.89 Second, it defines the presumptive period, i.e., between the
time a registration statement is issued and the time an ―earning statement covering a
period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration
statement‖ is issued.90 Third, it establishes the post-presumptive period, i.e.,
following the issuance of such an ―earning statement covering a period of at least
twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement.‖ 91
During each of these periods, reasonable reliance must either be proven affirmatively
or is an affirmative defense and can be refuted.
The presumption of reliance in a Section 11 claim is a universal concept
among courts across this country. 92 It is in keeping with the congressional intent
behind passage of the Securities Act and the furtherance of investor protection and
fraud prevention that the Securities Act was designed to accomplish. Despite the
strict liability nature of a Section 11 claim, however, it is important to bear in mind
that the presumption of reliance under Section 11 is just that – a presumption. It does
not mean that reliance is not an element of a Section 11 claim, nor does it mean that
reliance is not part of a court‘s consideration of the issues at stake in the claim.
Before considering whether the Section 11 presumption applies, we
must address Plaintiffs‘ threshold argument.
Plaintiffs argue
primarily that reliance is not an element of a Section 11 claim and,
consequently, reliance is irrelevant to, and plays no role in, this case.
That is only partly true. Plaintiffs are correct to the extent that
reliance does not need to be proven (except post-earnings statement).
Reliance is ordinarily presumed.93
Congress developed the 12-month prescriptive period primarily as a means
of guarding against market forces and fluctuations.
89

See id.

90

See id.

91

Id.

See, e.g., Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1541 (8th Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir. 1996); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d at 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967); In re
AMF Bowling Sec. Litig., No. 99 Civ. 3023 (DC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9076WL 1033826, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2002); Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 313, 317 (D. Colo. 1999);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. ‗21‘ Int‘l Holdings, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
92

93

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1271-72 (emphasis in original).
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Congress realized that the price of securities fluctuates with
information received by the market about a certain company.
Without this provision, there could be an investor who only
purchased securities from companies with known faulty registration
statements. By doing this, the investor would always be able to
recover his purchase price from companies whose stock prices
dropped, but keep those stocks whose prices went up. 94
Assuming that the securities at issue were not purchased beyond the 12month window, a plaintiff will be able to take advantage of the reliance presumption.
Provided he can show that he purchased the security pursuant to a false or
misleading registration statement, ―[l]iability against the issuer . . . is virtually
absolute, even for innocent misstatements.‖ 95 In that event, he would not need to
prove an independent reliance on the misstatement or other filing in contention. 96
As discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit‘s opinions in the APA case are a
thorough and well reasoned application of the presumption of reliance to the
particular facts at issue.
A.

APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Technologies, Inc.,
476 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). 97

This case arose out of a merger in which the plaintiffs were sophisticated
―venture‖ investors and directors of Xpedite Systems, Inc. (―Xpedite‖), the publicly
James E. Shapiro, Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc.: Standing to Sue Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933; Reflections on Gustafson, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 134-35 (2000).
94

95

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).

See, e.g., In re Am. Cont‘l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1435 (D. Ariz.
1992).
96

A purchaser‘s reliance on the registration statement need not be proven unless the
plaintiff ―acquired the security after the issuer made generally available to its
security holders an earning statement covering a period of twelve months
beginning after the effective date of the registration statement.‖ Section 77k further
provides that reliance may be shown without proof that the plaintiff read the
registration statement.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2009)).
97

The authors of this article were defense counsel in the APA case.
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traded target corporation. The plaintiffs committed to acquire shares of Premiere
Technologies, Inc. (―Premiere‖), the acquiring corporation, prior to the public
offering of shares in conjunction with the merger. After the merger, when Premiere
experienced a temporary downturn, the plaintiffs sued Premiere and its officers
under Section 11 and for negligent misrepresentation under state law. 98
The plaintiffs were all former Xpedite shareholders who each held a large
stake in the company.99 Certain of the plaintiffs were investment funds in the Alan
Patricof family of funds and provided investment fund management services to
large, sophisticated institutional investors. 100 Robert Chefitz, an employee of the
investment funds, was charged with monitoring the funds‘ investment in Xpedite.101
He and another fund employee held seats on Xpedite‘s Board of Directors due to
the funds‘ significant holdings in Xpedite.102 The remaining plaintiffs, Stuart and
David Epstein, were brothers who made substantial venture investments in Xpedite
as individual investors and as a result maintained a joint seat on Xpedite‘s Board.103
In February 1997, Xpedite‘s Board established a Special Committee to
explore strategic alternatives to achieve liquidity for the large venture investors and
value for public market shareholders.104 Both Chefitz and David Epstein were
appointed to the Special Committee, which was assisted by Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. as its financial investment advisor, by Ernst & Young LLP as
its audit advisor, and by Paul Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP for legal due
diligence.105

The plaintiffs originally asserted Section 12 claims also, but expressly abandoned them during
appellate oral argument. See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1267 n.3. The Section 15 claim, a derivative
liability cause of action, was dismissed with the Section 11 claim. See id.
98

99

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1263.

100

See id.

101

See id.

102

See id.

103

See id.

104

See id.

105

See id. at 1263-64.
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In October 1997, Premiere expressed an interest in acquiring Xpedite. 106
Upon receipt of an offer from Premiere, the Special Committee was obligated to
conduct a due diligence investigation into the offer and to make a recommendation
to the Board. Chefitz led the Committee‘s due diligence efforts, and the Committee,
including David Epstein as a member, was given access to voluminous amounts of
confidential and non-public information regarding Premiere. 107 The Special
Committee recommended to Xpedite‘s Board that the merger offer should be
accepted, and the two companies agreed on a stock-for-stock transaction. 108
Separate from and prior to the public offering process that was to be
associated with the merger, the plaintiffs executed Stockholder Agreements in
November 1997. 109 The Stockholder Agreements granted an irrevocable proxy to
Premiere‘s Board of Directors to vote in favor of the merger, thereby reflecting the
plaintiffs‘ investment decision as to Premiere.110 Also in November 1997, the
plaintiffs executed Affiliate Letters, in which they agreed to the placement of a
restrictive legend on their Premiere stock certificates.111 The Affiliate Letters
provided, among other things, that the plaintiffs would be subject to a minimum of a
30-day post-merger lock-up within which they were prohibited from selling their
Premiere stock.112 The plaintiffs further agreed that Premiere was ―under no
obligation to file a registration statement with the [SEC] covering the disposition of
[their] shares.‖113 Thus, the plaintiffs conceded that their acquisition of shares was
separate from the subsequent offering.
In January 1998, Premiere filed a Registration Statement for the Xpedite
merger with the Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖), which became

106

See id. at 1263.

107

See id. at 1264.

108

See id.

109

See id. at 1264-65.

See id. at 1264. The SEC has recognized that executing such agreements could constitute an
investment decision. See Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7606A, 63
Fed. Reg. 67,174-01, 67, 235-67, 236 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998).
110

111

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1264-65.

112

See id.; APA I, supra note 14, at 31.

113

APA IV, supra note 14, at 1265.
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effective on January 28, 1998, and thereby initiated the public offering process. 114
Upon consummation of the merger on February 27, 1998, the plaintiffs enjoyed a
500% return on their initial investment in Xpedite. 115
Later that year, in June 1998, ―Premiere announced that it would have a
shortfall in its revenues, and that it would be taking a charge against its bad debt
reserves.‖ 116 On the day of the announcement, the price of Premiere stock dropped
by 28%, and the lawsuit was filed shortly thereafter.117
After the completion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary
judgment because the plaintiffs had made their investment decision to acquire the
relevant shares before the allegedly fraudulent registration statement was issued. 118
In addition, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the
Securities Act because they had not acquired stock pursuant to a public offering, but
had instead made their decision to invest based on access to inside information and
advice from their lawyers and investment bankers. 119 The defendants also asserted
that, because the plaintiffs had failed to conduct effective due diligence, they co uld
not justifiably rely on any representations by Premiere and, therefore, could not bring
a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 120
Analyzing ―the entire context of the transaction,‖ 121 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the plaintiffs‘ negligent
misrepresentation claim failed. 122 The Court held as follows:
Plaintiffs cannot establish reasonable reliance on Defendants‘ alleged
misrepresentations because Plaintiffs had notice of risk factors

114

See id.

115

See id. at 1265 n.1.

116

See id. at 1265.

117

See id.

118

See APA I, supra note 14, at 6.

119

See id. at 7.

120

See id.

Id. at 12 (quoting Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 2003 WL
22053957, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2003)).
121

122

Id. at 25.
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related to the areas in which they contend Defendants provided
inaccurate information; Plaintiffs [were] sophisticated parties and
were represented by sophisticated legal and financial advisors; and
Plaintiffs had access to information through the due diligence
process, but did not seek information related to the areas of concern
and did not negotiate specific warranties or representations from
Premiere concerning these issues. 123
The Court also dismissed the Securities Act claims because ―it would not
serve the purposes of the 1933 Act to allow sophisticated investors who had access
to significant confidential and inside information through the exercise of due
diligence rights to convert their acquisition of securities into a public offering by
mere fact that Defendants provided a Registration Statement.‖ 124
The plaintiffs appealed.125 As discussed below, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit was the first to recognize the impossibility of reliance defense under
Section 11. 126 The Court held that the logical scope of the presumption framework
in Section 11 dictates that no liability may be imposed in any situation in which
reliance would have been impossible, including where the plaintiffs made their
investment decisions before the registration statement was issued or they should
have known of the alleged misstatement at issue. 127
The Court analogized the factual circumstances before it to those of a
plaintiff who acquires a security pursuant to a registration statement, but knows at
the time of the acquisition of the untruths or omissions contained therein.128
Because Section 11 permits an affirmative defense against such a plaintiff if reliance
would have been unreasonable, the Court held that ―[i]n a case like the one currently
before the Court, the purchaser committed to the sale before the alleged
misstatements or omissions were made and therefore before such statements or

123

Id.

124

Id. at 31.

125

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1266.

126

See id.

127

See APA II, supra note 14, at 12-17.

128

See id. at 12-13.
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omissions could have affected the price and played any role in the purchase
decision.‖129
The Court noted that an argument asserting that ―due to the tim[ing] of their
investment decision, Plaintiffs could not possibly have relied on the registration
statement and therefore should not be entitled to maintain their claims under Section
11‖ was an ―attractive argument.‖ 130 The Court held as follows.
Thus, the statute prevents recovery even during the initial period
covered by the statute if reliance would have been unreasonable. It is
conceivable, therefore, that if a plaintiff committed to an acquisition
prior to the filing of a registration statement – if reliance were a
complete impossibility under any theory – he too should not be
permitted to recover under Section 11. 131
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the negligent
misrepresentation claim, but reversed and remanded the dismissal of the Section 11
claim because it did not reach the merits of the application of the reliance defense
and it rejected the defendants‘ argument that the Section 11 claim failed because
there was no public offering.132
On remand, the defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment. 133
The defendants argued that the Eleventh Circuit‘s guidance on the impossibility of
reliance based on the timing of the plaintiffs‘ investment decision precluded their
Section 11 claims. 134 The district court followed the Eleventh Circuit‘s ―roadmap,‖
held that reliance was impossible, and dismissed the Section 11 claim. 135
The plaintiffs appealed again. 136 The Eleventh Circuit held that reliance was
impossible and that no Section 11 claim could be asserted under the set of facts
129

Id. at 15.

130

Id. at 12.

131

Id. at 13.

132

See id. at 23-24.

133

See APA III, supra note 14, at 6.

134

See id.

135

See id. at 14.

136

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1267.
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presented.137 In affirming the district court‘s opinion, the Eleventh Circuit stated
initially that the ―statutory language must be read in the context of the purpose it was
intended to serve.‖ 138 The Court rejected at the outset the plaintiffs‘ position that the
timing of the investment decision was irrelevant. 139 Instead, it deemed the plaintiffs
to have conceded that the relevant investment decision was made before the
registration statement was issued. 140
The Eleventh Circuit held that the insider plaintiffs did not reasonably rely
on the allegedly false registration statement and squarely rejected the notion that
reliance is not an element of Section 11. 141 The Court held that, ―as a matter of
common sense, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the presumption in light of the timing of
their investment decision and commitment. To hold otherwise would mean that an
impossible fact will be presumed in Plaintiffs‘ favor.‖142
The Court also held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the presumption
of reliance because of their status as insiders and due diligence rights.143
Plaintiffs had access to a wide range of information and knew of the
stock issuance months before the registration statement was filed.
They had the opportunity to learn (and, in fact, were on notice) of
the potential problems with certain of Premiere‘s business
relationships, its telephone calling card business, and the Orchestrate
product of which they now complain. Congress has noted that
liability under Section 11 is imposed and justified because members
of the public are presumed to be ―innocent‖ and, as compared with
the issuers of stock, do not have the ―opportunity to learn the truth;‖
instead, they are merely reliant upon what they are told. See S. Rep.
No. 47 at 5. Plaintiffs do not appear to fit that characterization. . . .
137

See id. at 1277.

Id. at 1268 (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1237 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 829 (2005)).
138

139

See id. at 1269-70.

140

See id.

141

See id. at 1277.

142

Id. at 1273.

143

Id. at 1277.
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In sum, we hold that the Section 11 presumption of reliance does not
apply in the limited and narrow situation where sophisticated
investors participating in an arms-length corporate merger make a
legally binding investment commitment months before the filing of a
defective registration statement. 144
Thus, where reliance is an impossibility due to the timing of the
plaintiff‘s investment decision, a Section 11 claim should fail as a matter of
law under the APA case.
B.

Constructive Knowledge Defense Under Section 11

Another important aspect of the APA case was the extent to which
constructive knowledge of the alleged misstatement provides a defense under
Section 11. As discussed above, both Sections 11 and 12 provide a defense based on
knowledge of the plaintiff.145 Actual knowledge is an obvious concept, but it is
difficult to prove in reality because one cannot ―get in the mind‖ of the plaintiff.
Constructive knowledge is the more practical notion and, thus, is espoused
widely in the law. Constructive knowledge is defined as ―[k]nowledge that one using
reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore is attributed by law to a given
person.‖146 Constructive knowledge exists for the following two essential purposes:
(1) it prevents individuals from turning a blind eye to initial signs of trouble; and (2)
it recognizes that proving actual knowledge is next to impossible. 147

Id. The court also noted correctly that the concept of ―tracing‖ substantiates this reading of
Section 11. See id. at 1276. In other words, under Section 11, a plaintiff must be able to trace the
security and purchase to the defective registration statement in order to induce liability. See DeMaria
v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2003); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 873 (5th
Cir. 2003); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 269 (2d Cir. 1967). Where the plaintiff had actual or
constructive knowledge, such necessary links to the registration statement are impossible.
144

145

See supra notes 62-64, 76-78 and accompanying text.
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BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (7th ed. 1999).

See Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 957, 978-79 (1998);
Robert B. Edesess, Jr., The End of Innocence: An Actual Knowledge Threshold for Intermediaries Holding
Fiduciaries’/Clients’ Assets, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 377, 406-07 (2004).
147
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This concept of constructive knowledge, however, is rarely used in defending
against a Section 11 claim. 148 Defendants should recognize the role of such
constructive knowledge in Section 11 and advocate against liability where reliance, as
a result, would be unreasonable.
A defense under Section 11 for a plaintiff‘s actual or constructive knowledge
of an alleged misrepresentation would not be an anomaly. There are several parallels
in the law. Actual knowledge and constructive knowledge, contemplating an
objective reasonable person standard, appear in several facets of commercial and
securities law.
The concept of knowledge plays a role in securities fraud actions under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.149
Severe recklessness, which suggests that an individual should have known of an act
or statement, is enough to make the required showing of scienter, or knowledge,
under those provisions. 150 The Eleventh Circuit held as follows:
Severe recklessness is limited to those highly unreasonable omissions
or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, and that present a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that
the defendant must have been aware of it. 151
Section 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, under which the SEC can bring
aiding and abetting actions, provides another example. 152 That section expressly
provides that
[a]ny person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another
Courts have held that constructive knowledge cannot be used as a defense to a Section 12 claim.
See, e.g., Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1989) (―Constructive knowledge cannot bar a
purchaser‘s recovery under section 12(2).‖); Parkhurst v. N. Am. Fin. Servs. Cos., 919 F. Supp. 270,
275 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
148

See generally Keith A. Rowley, Cause of Action for Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and/or Rule 10b-5, 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 271 (2006).
149

150

See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).

Id. at 1282 n.18 (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int‘l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc)).
151

152

See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2009).
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person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or
regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in
violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom
such assistance is provided.153
Courts have interpreted this to mean that, under certain circumstances,
―‗recklessness is enough‘ to satisfy the knowledge element.‖154 In the same vein, the
statute of limitations for securities fraud claims starts to run upon either actual or
constructive knowledge of the alleged misstatement by the plaintiff. To trigger the
running of the statute, inquiry notice is the same as actual notice. 155 ―Inquiry notice‖
is ―‗the term used for knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to
begin investigating the possibility that his legal rights had been infringed.‘ . . . Inquiry
notice is triggered by evidence of the possibility of fraud, not full exposition of the
scam itself.‖156 Therefore, even though a person does not have actual knowledge of
a fraudulent act, the statute of limitations for securities fraud is triggered when she
should have known of it. Section 13 of the Securities Act, which codifies the
limitation, provides that the statute of limitations starts to run upon either ―discovery
of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.‖157
State law fraud or negligent misrepresentation cases also turn on due
diligence and constructive knowledge. 158 ―Each party to a transaction is under a duty
to exercise reasonable diligence to protect himself and to make proper inquiry to
ascertain the truth.‖159 In APA II, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed to exercise
their due diligence rights ―in a meaningful way‖ because they failed to ask the right
questions, did not negotiate for warranties, and failed to probe the technology
153

Id. (emphasis added).

See SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Armstrong v. McAlphin,
699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983)); see, e.g., SEC v. Iannelli, No. 74 Civ. 3417, 1975 WL 348, at *1, 5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1975).
154

155

See Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002).

Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kauthar SDN BHD v.
Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 670 (7th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original).
156

157

15 U.S.C. § 77m (2009).

158

See APA II, supra note 14, at 18-19.

159

CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 32-4 (2009-10 ed.).
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products upon which the acquiring corporation was built. 160 The Court also held
that the plaintiffs should have been on notice of potential problems, which were
disclosed by the acquiring corporation in its public filings. 161
These examples illustrate that knowledge includes both actual knowledge and
constructive knowledge in many facets of the law. Absent such a comprehensive
concept of knowledge, parties would be substantially prejudiced by the inherent
difficulty of entering into an individual‘s mind to determine what she or he actually
knew. Limiting actual knowledge also would facilitate the shunning of responsibility.
Such practical concerns warrant limitation of Section 11 liability where either actual
or constructive knowledge exists.
As discussed above, the constructive knowledge defense to Section 11
liability was presented to the Eleventh Circuit in APA II and APA IV.162 The
defendants argued that the plaintiffs were corporate insiders who failed to
thoroughly exercise due diligence rights prior to making any decision to invest in
Premiere stock.163 The Court agreed and held that ―a plaintiff may not recover under
Section 11 if it ‗knew [of] or had available‘ information that would have revealed the
untruth or omission contained in the registration statement.‖ 164
Incorporating a constructive knowledge defense into Section 11 and
precluding liability where the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged
misrepresentation is also consistent with recent public policy articulations as to the
additional ―gatekeeping‖ responsibilities shouldered by those who typically find
themselves foreclosed by this defense, such as insiders.165 Under both the SarbanesOxley Act and its subsequent applications, fiduciary duties have surpassed a simple
monitoring model to encompass an increased emphasis on active gatekeeping and
engagement.

160

APA II, supra note 14, at 19-20.

161

See id. at 20-23.

162

See discussion supra Section IV(B).

163

APA II, supra note 14, at 16-17, 19-24.

APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 (quoting Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)) (emphasis in original).
164

165

See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).

2010]

DEFENSES TO CLAIMS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

81

Today, businesses operate in an environment of raised professional, legal,
and ethical standards. In the SEC chairman‘s own words, directors
must redefine corporate governance with practices that go beyond
mere adherence to new rules and demonstrate ethics, integrity,
honesty, and transparency . . . . Directors must ensure that they
remain the true stewards of corporate accountability, and their
actions must demonstrate their dedication to this stewardship
without undue interference . . . . 166
Indeed, recent corporate governance principles align greatly with the
purposes of the Securities Act, and individuals tasked with due diligence need do far
more than a mere formalized check and balance on corporate transactions.
As discussed above, inside, sophisticated, or due diligence-empowered
investors are not the type to whom the Securities Act affords protection. To the
contrary, these are corporate actors upon whom the SEC relies to be the stewards of
corporate governance, to establish an ethical ―tone at the top[,]‖ and to protect the
interests of public market shareholders. 167 The goal is to achieve a value-based
system that moves beyond technical compliance with the law and towards directors
acting in an intellectually independent and diligent manner to promote the spirit of
the securities laws.
There has also been a recent spate of high profile cases in which the
Delaware courts and others have struggled with the issue of directors‘ fiduciary
duties to the shareholders of public companies. 168 Limiting the scope of Section 11
liability for constructive knowledge would support these corporate governance
trends. It would remove any artificial incentives for inside investors to abandon their
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Directors Education Institute (Mar.
16, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch031605whd.htm.
166

William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Foreign Policy Association, 2003 WL
23638628 (Sept. 25, 2003); see also Cynthia A. Glassman, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the
Aspen Institute Italia Seminars for Leaders, 2003 WL 23638648 (Nov. 7, 2003); William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks from Directors College at Stanford University Law School,
2004 WL 1571974 (June 20, 2004).
167

See, e.g., Beam v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004); In re Oracle
Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825
A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576
(S.D. Tex. 2003).
168
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obligations to access sufficient information in order to protect public shareholders.
These interpretations would enhance the private policing system that the SEC is
actively promoting and strengthening.

V.

LOSS CAUSATION UNDER SECTIONS 11 AND 12
A.

Statutory Framework

As noted above, lack of loss causation is an affirmative defense under
Section 11.169 ―[D]efendants can limit damages by showing that the plaintiffs‘ losses
were caused by something other than their misrepresentations.‖ 170 In other words,
[u]nder § 11, defendants are liable only for the losses caused by
material misrepresentations or omissions in the registration
statement. Once the plaintiff has established damages, the defendant
may prove that all or part of those damages were caused by factors
other than those misrepresentations or omissions. Thus, while in the
169

The statute states:
The suit authorized under subsection (a) of this section may be to recover such
damages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid for the security
(not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the
value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at
which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if
such damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference between
the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was
offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought:
Provided, that if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other than
the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the registration statement, with
respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or
all such damages shall not be recoverable.

15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2009) (emphasis added).
See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Bastian v. Petren Res.
Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., No. 02-168(WHW), 2007
WL 1217980, at *6-7 (D. N.J. Apr. 23, 2007) (―Loss causation is a statutory affirmative defense for
Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) claims, and so is not an element of a prima facie case.‖); Madden v.
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 118 F. App‘x 150, 153-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (―Lack of causation of loss is an
affirmative defense to § 11 claims.‖).
170
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§ 10(b) context it is the plaintiff who must prove loss causation, in
the § 11 context it is the defendant who has the burden of proving
that his misdeeds were not the cause of the losses. 171
In reality, the loss causation requirement under Section 11 represents a
shifting of the burden from the plaintiff‘s proof to an affirmative aspect of the
issuer‘s defense. The requirement enables the defendant to take stock of the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the securities, and to account for other
potential causes of the loss that the plaintiff claims to have sustained. If the
defendant can prove that the loss ―did not result from his misconduct,‖ the
plaintiff‘s claim under Section 11 is fatally flawed. 172
The concept of loss causation itself stems from the language contained
directly within the text of Section 11. To prevail on the affirmative defense, the
issuer or other defendant must be able to show that the loss sustained by the
plaintiff, such as a decline in stock prices, resulted from factors other than the alleged
false or misleading registration statement. 173 This may be demonstrated in the form
of expert testimony, including market valuations, analyses, stock trends, purchasing
history, adjustments, and other related areas. It may also be proven based on the
undisputed facts of public record regarding, inter alia, the information in the market,
the reasons for the stock price decline, or the lack of a stock price reaction. Thus,
loss causation is an appropriate ground for dismissal at the motion to dismiss or
summary judgment stage where it is lacking as a matter of law based on the
undisputed facts.174
Section 12 is similar to Section 11. As noted previously, unlike Section 10(b),
Section 12 also does not require the plaintiff to prove loss causation. ―‗The buyer
171

Hayes v. Arthur Young & Co., No. 91-15531, 1994 WL 463493, at *10 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994).

Campbell v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., No. 85-1703, 1987 WL 44742, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 9,
1987) (―[A] defendant is not liable for damages which he can prove did not result from his
misconduct.‖).
172

173

See Madden, 118 F. App‘x at 154.

See, e.g., Azzolini v. Corts Trust II for Provident Fin. Trust I, No. 103CV1003, 2005 WL 3448053,
at *5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2005); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 243, 253-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Cats v. Protection One, Inc., No. CV99-3755-DTRCX, 2001
WL 34070755, at *11 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2001), rev’d on other grounds, Garbini v. Protection One, Inc., 49
F. App‘x 169 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-68 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 n.8.
174
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need not show any causal connection between the misrepresentation and his damage;
indeed, he need not even show that he has been damaged.‘‖ 175 However, as with
Section 11, the defendant can defeat a claim under Section 12 if he can show that the
loss sustained by the plaintiff was not the result of the alleged misrepresentations or
omissions.
In an action described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, if the
person who offered or sold such security proves that any portion or
all of the amount recoverable under subsection (a)(2) of this section
represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject security
resulting from such part of the prospectus or oral communication,
with respect to which the liability of that person is asserted, not being
true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statement not misleading, then such portion
or amount, as the case may be, shall not be recoverable. 176
Moreover, although the plaintiff does not have an obligation to plead loss
causation in the complaint, dismissal of a securities action under Section 12 is
appropriate when it is apparent as a matter of law that the loss is not attributable to
the alleged misrepresentations or omissions. 177 Beyond the dismissal stage, the
defendant also can make use of expert testimony to demonstrate the absence of a
link between the alleged misstatement or omission and the subsequent decline in the
value of the plaintiff‘s securities.178 As discussed below, the Supreme Court held in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo that there often are several possible explanations
for a decline in the value of securities, and thus it is not necessarily true that the
Beloit Corp. v. Emett & Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154, 1991 WL 153459, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14,
1991) (quoting LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 873 (2d ed. 1988)); Casella
v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989); LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1200-01 (15th ed. 2003) [hereinafter LOSS].
175

176

15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2009).

See Azzolini, 2005 WL 3448053, at *5; see also Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67,
74-75 (2d Cir. 1998); Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assocs., Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 1992); In re
WRT Energy Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 3610 (JFK), 2005 WL 323729, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2005); In
re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 5
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1277 (3d ed.
2004).
177

See, e.g., Carpe v. Aquila, Inc., No. 02-0388-CV-W-FJG, 2005 WL 1138833, at *2-4 (W.D. Mo. Mar.
23, 2005).
178
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alleged misstatement or omission was the actual cause of the loss. 179 In some
instances, the defendant may even be able to show that the plaintiff did not actually
sustain a loss at all, but instead experienced a gain on the value of his securities.180 In
either event, the affirmative defense of loss causation is an effective tool to combat a
Section 12 claim.
B.

Loss Causation under Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)

In Dura, the Supreme Court confirmed that an inflated purchase price alone
will not ipso facto amount to or proximately cause the economic loss needed to allege
and prove loss causation under a Section 10(b) claim. 181 Rather, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant‘s misrepresentation, or other fraudulent conduct,
proximately caused the economic loss. 182
As set forth above, Section 11 and Section 12 plaintiffs do not have to plead
or prove loss causation as part of a prima facie case. 183 Instead, the burden shifts to
the defendant to show that the loss was the result of something other than the
defendant‘s misrepresentations or omissions. 184 In that regard, the rule set forth in
Dura would have no technical bearing on claims brought under Section 11 and
Section 12, but Dura nevertheless is instructive for the guidance it can offer to
defendants in formulating their affirmative defense. Notably, the Supreme Court
observed as follows:
For one thing, as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated
179

See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005).

See, e.g., Hicks v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 01 Civ. 10071 (HB), 2003 WL 21672085, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003).
180

181

Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 346-47.

182

See id. at 346.

See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 274 (3d Cir. 2005); Madden v. Deloitte & Touche,
LLP, 118 F. App‘x 150, 153-54 (9th Cir. 2004); Beloit Corp. v. Emett & Chandler Cos., No. 90-55154,
1991 WL 153459, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991); Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th
Cir. 1990); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., No.
02-168 (WHW), 2007 WL 1217980, at *6-7 (D. N.J. Apr. 23, 2007); LOSS, supra note 175, at 873.
183

See, e.g., In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 274 (―[D]efendants can limit damages by showing that the
plaintiffs‘ losses were caused by something other than their misrepresentations.‖).
184
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purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant
possesses equivalent value. Moreover, the logical link between the
inflated share purchase price and any later economic loss is not
invariably strong. Shares are normally purchased with an eye toward
a later sale. But if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before
the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not
have led to any loss. If the purchaser sells later after the truth makes
its way into the market place, an initially inflated purchase price might
mean a later loss. But that is far from inevitably so. When the
purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that
lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but
changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations,
new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other
events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of
that lower price. (The same is true in respect to a claim that a share‘s
higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been – a claim we
do not consider here.) Other things being equal, the longer the time
between purchase and sale, the more likely that this is so, i.e., the
more likely that other factors caused the loss. 185
Dura acknowledges the existence of many different possible causes of a
decline in stock price, and the defendant has these alternate causes at his disposal in
defending against a plaintiff‘s charge that the defendant‘s misrepresentations or
omissions resulted in the stock price decline. Shifts in economic circumstances or
investor expectations may have been the proximate cause of the ultimate decline in
share price, or it may have been attributable to a fundamental change in the industry
itself. Whatever the reason, the decline in stock price does not necessarily have to
result from a defendant‘s misrepresentation or omissions, as the Supreme Court in
Dura acknowledges.
C.

Loss Causation Defense Applied in APA

The principles espoused by Dura were presented to the district court in APA
in the Section 11 context. The defendants argued that there had been no financial
restatement, and the plaintiffs had proffered no evidence to link the stock price drop

185

Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342-43 (emphasis in original).
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and their purported damages to any alleged misstatement. 186 The plaintiffs argued in
response that loss causation was not their burden, and that disproving it was the
defendants‘ burden.187 The defendants responded that, regardless of whose burden it
was, the court should grant summary judgment, because loss causation was
impossible as a matter of law because the plaintiffs made their investment decision
before the registration statement was issued, and thus before the alleged
misstatements were made. 188
The district court agreed with the defendants, holding that because the
plaintiffs made their investment decision before the allegedly misleading registration
statement was issued, and because they had due diligence rights, the alleged
misstatements could not have caused their loss.189 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the ―[p]laintiffs‘ [Section] 11
claim suffer[ed] from an impossibility of reliance and inability to establish loss
causation.‖ 190
APA demonstrates that loss causation under Section 11 follows the same
rationale as Dura.191 Although loss causation is a defense, rather than an affirmative
element, under Section 11, it is an appropriate basis for dismissal if it is lacking as a
matter of law.

VI.

TRUTH-ON-THE-MARKET DEFENSE
A.

The Truth-on-the-Market Doctrine

The ―truth-on-the-market‖ doctrine serves as the inverse counterpart to the
―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory, which is commonly used to establish the reliance
element for a claim brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act. 192 In its most

186

See APA III, supra note 14, at 6.

187

See id.

188

See id. at 6, 15.

189

See id. at 15-16.

190

Id. at 16.

191

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1277 n.8.

The ―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory provides that a misrepresentation or omission will affect the
price of securities that are traded in an efficient market, and an investor will be able to rely on the
192
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basic form, the doctrine provides that a misrepresentation cannot be considered
―material‖ for purposes of establishing liability under Section 10(b) if the
information constituting the misrepresentation is already known to the market. 193
The typical fact pattern in securities fraud cases involves either an overly
inflated or significantly undervalued stock price caused by the misrepresentation or
omission that the defendant placed into the market through public disclosures, such
as a registration statement, conference call, or SEC filings. The market reacts to the
fraudulent statement, and the stock price is based on the extent of the
―misinformation‖ in the market; when the truth ultimately is revealed, the market
again reacts, and the stock price declines.194 Even if the defendant made
misstatements, it can avoid liability by demonstrating that the stock price decline was
not the result of its misstatements, but was due to other causes, such as a shift in
economic circumstances or investor expectations.195
The ―truth-on-the-market‖ doctrine operates under the same reasoning, but
results in a different outcome. In the truth-on-the-market scenario, the stock price
in the market is based on truthful information that is publicly available. 196 If
investors elect to purchase or sell their stock, and they suffer a loss as a result of a
stock price decline or inflation, there should be no liability because all of the
information surrounding the company was truthful and fully available in the
market.197
The defendant can demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations did not
affect the market price of the securities, and thus the market could not have relied on
the misrepresentations, because the truth of the matter was already known. 198 The
main inquiry in assessing the impact of the doctrine is the manner in which the
integrity of the market in purchasing the securities. See Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740,
745-46 (11th Cir. 1984).
See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d
1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3
F.3d 208, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1993).
193

194

See, e.g., Dura Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338-40, 347 (2005).

195

See id. at 338, 347.

196

See Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.

197

See id.

198

See id.; Provenz, 102 F.3d at 1492; Associated Randall Bank, 3 F.3d at 213-14.
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―truth‖ found its way into the market. ―Prompt incorporation of news into stock
price is the foundation for the fraud-on-the-market doctrine and therefore supports
a truth-on-the-market doctrine as well.‖199 To avail himself of the doctrine, the
defendant must be prepared to show the extent of the efforts that were made to
introduce the ―truth‖ to the public.200
Even in a fraud on the market case, corporate insiders are not
relieved of their duty to disclose material information where that
information has received only brief mention in a few poorlycirculated or lightly-regarded publications. The investing public
justifiably places heavy reliance on the statements and opinions of
corporate insiders. In order to avoid Rule 10b-5 liability, any material
information which insiders fail to disclose must be transmitted to the
public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counterbalance any misleading impression created by the insiders’ one-sided
representations.201
B.

Truth-on-the-Market Defense Applied to Section 11 Cases

As discussed above, the truth-on-the-market doctrine precludes liability
where the purportedly injured party knew or should have known of the information
that allegedly resulted in the injury. This fundamental principle plays an explicit and
implicit role in Section 11‘s liability scheme.
Section 11‘s presumption of reliance stems from the notion that a misleading
registration statement is considered to constitute fraud on the market due to the
immediate spread of information.202 Thus, proof of reading a registration statement
may not be required in certain circumstances, because even those who did not read
the registration statement would have suffered an impact when the misleading
disclosure affected the value of the stock. 203
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989); accord In re Apple
Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1989); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169,
1179-80 (7th Cir. 1987); Rodman v. Grant Found., 608 F.2d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
199

200

In re Apple Computer, 886 F.2d at 1116.

201

Id. (emphasis added); see also Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.

202

See APA IV, supra note 14, at 1275, 1277.

203

See id.
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The necessary corollary of this rationale is that there are instances in which
the fraud-on-the-market theory is inapplicable. Such instances include those in
which (1) the truthful information is already in the market, i.e., the truth-on-themarket scenario; (2) an individual was not entitled to rely on the efficient market; or
(3) an individual could not have read the registration statement because it did not
exist. In such instances, true reliance is impossible, and any presumption is
foreclosed.
In addition, if the information relating to the alleged misstatement is in the
public domain via other sources, including the issuer‘s disclosures or the media,
either the truth-on-the-market or the constructive knowledge defense may apply. 204
One can envision several factual scenarios where ―soft information‖ related to the
issuer‘s business, which the plaintiff claims was not disclosed by the issuer, was in
the market already, thus precluding a claim. As discussed below, several real world
case examples are illustrative as to how these defenses may work to foreclose a
Section 11 claim.
As discussed above, in In re Mirant Corp. Securities Litigation, the plaintiffs
alleged that Mirant‘s initial public offering registration statement and prospectus
were misleading because they failed to disclose Mirant‘s alleged misconduct in the
California energy crisis during the summers of 2000 and 2001. 205 The California
energy crisis and the resulting governmental proceedings and private lawsuits were
widely publicized in the media and fully disclosed in Mirant‘s public filings.206 In an
early opinion regarding the first round of motion-to-dismiss briefing, the court
assessed whether the plaintiffs‘ claims were time barred by the statute of
limitations.207 In doing so, the court discussed at length Mirant‘s disclosures, articles
in the media, and other information in the public domain regarding the California
energy crisis and Mirant‘s alleged role in it.208 Such a factual scenario, where the
pertinent information was widely disclosed as alleged by the complaint, would be one
204

See Ganino, 228 F.3d at 167.

Order, In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 1:02-CV-1467, 2009 WL 48188, at *1 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 7, 2009); In re Mirant Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 1:02-CV-1467, 2003 WL 24027927, at *1
(N.D. Ga. July 14, 2003).
205

206

See In re Mirant Corp., 2003 WL 24027927, at *7, 9-11.

207

See id. at *4-17.

208

See id. at *7-14.
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in which a truth-on-the-market defense could apply to preclude a Section 11 claim
because any alleged misstatements by Mirant could not have been relied on by the
market because the truth was already known. 209
Moreover, the plaintiffs‘
constructive knowledge of the facts in the public domain should also bar their
Section 11 claim under the knowledge defense in Section 11(e).210 Assuming arguendo
that Mirant‘s disclosures were false as to its manipulation of the energy markets, the
allegations in the governmental proceedings, private lawsuits, and the press would
have provided a reasonable investor with knowledge of the misstatement.
Another example of where the truth-on-the-market and constructive
knowledge defenses may be applicable is presented by the facts of In re Prestige Brands
Holdings, Inc.211 In Prestige Brands, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to
disclose that sales of a particular product were declining.212 In fact, the prospectus
disclosed the declining sales in detail in several places. 213 The court dismissed the
plaintiffs‘ Section 10(b) fraud claims based on the alleged declining sales because
―[a]ny reasonable investor or potential investor reading the Prospectus thus knew, or
reasonably should have known, that Comet products had not been performing as
profitably as they once did.‖214 Accordingly, the detailed disclosures precluded the
plaintiffs‘ claims.215
The Prestige Brands court reached the correct result and it confirmed the
notion that disclosures about the alleged misstatement will bar a securities claim. 216
The truth-on-the-market and constructive knowledge defenses, however, would also
work to preclude Section 11 claims where the information was in the market by way
of the company‘s detailed disclosures.
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No. 05 CV. 06924(CLB), 2006 WL 2147719 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2006).
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Id. at *2.
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Id. at *2-3.
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Id. at *6.

215

Id. at *7.
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See, e.g., Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 9 (2d Cir. 1996).
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CONCLUSION

Section 11 claims that sound in fraud should be dismissed if they are not pled
with particularity under Rule 9(b). After the motion to dismiss stage, however,
claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act are sometimes viewed as
difficult to get dismissed via dispositive motion before trial because they have a
lower burden of proof with regard to the substantive elements than do fraud claims
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. There are, however, several explicit and
implicit defenses available under the statutes or relevant precedent that should be
considered at summary judgment, or even earlier procedural stages of the litigation, if
the undisputed facts in the complaint or the public domain support the defenses. As
recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in the APA case, the defenses of lack of reliance,
constructive knowledge, and loss causation are not foreclosed to defendants until a
trial on the merits.

